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This paper summarises the main theoretical findings of a large-scale qualitative project on the 
transposition, enforcement and application of six EU labour law Directives in fifteen member states. 
Focusing on the transposition stage, our argument starts from a theoretical puzzle: When confronting 
the empirical results from our 91 cases with the various hypotheses that we derived from the literature, 
it turns out that all causal conditions suggested by existing theories, and even two of the most 
prominent hypotheses (on misfit and veto players), have at best rather weak explanatory power. On 
closer inspection, our qualitative studies show that even their basic rationale does not hold in some 
groups of countries. As a solution, we offer a typology of three worlds of compliance within the 
fifteen EU member states covered by our study, each of which is characterised by an ideal-typical 
transposition style: a ‘world of law observance’, a ‘world of domestic politics’, and a ‘world of 
neglect’. This typology provides the key to understanding when and how individual theoretical 
propositions are relevant. 
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theorem 
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1. Introduction
* 
The growing literature on the domestic impact of European Union (EU) policies provides for a range 
of explanatory factors that positively or negatively influence timeliness and correctness of 
implementation (i.e. transposition, enforcement and application in the member states). While the 
relevance of many of these factors seems to be highly plausible, EU scholarship is still missing a study 
that uses an encompassing theoretical approach that also takes into account the findings of earlier 
implementation studies and helps to understand when and where individual theoretical propositions 
are at all relevant in a world of diverse institutional patterns. 
Towards this aim, we will present results from a collaborative research project that analysed the 
national transposition, enforcement, and application of six EU labour law Directives in the fifteen 
‘old’ member states (for the full range of findings, see Falkner, Treib, Hartlapp & Leiber 2005). For 
scholars interested in implementation, EU Directives are of particular interest. They are not directly 
applicable at the national level, but have to be incorporated into national law first. We chose six 
crucial labour law Directives from the 1990s regulating national issues, hence EU labour law that 
actually alters pre-existing national rules. They concern written information on contractual 
employment conditions (91/533/EEC); parental leave (96/34/EC); working time (93/104/EC); and the 
protection of pregnant (92/85/EEC), young (94/33/EC) and part-time workers (97/81/EC). 
More than 180 expert interviews were conducted with experts from the ministries, interest groups 
and labour inspections in the fifteen member states. We collected material on the pre-existing national 
standards and on the process of adjustment. In addition to assessing implementation success or failure 
on a case-by-case basis, we tried to trace the origin of implementation problems. Which factors lead to 
better or worse compliance with EU law? Do these factors hold across countries and Directives? For 
reasons of time and space, this paper will focus on the process of incorporating EU Directives into 
domestic law (transposition), and it will concentrate on two of the most important hypotheses in 
explaining transposition. Empirical evidence indicates that the causal conditions these approaches 
suggest are of little help in explaining the outcomes across all countries. Therefore, we will present an 
alternative concept of how to explain domestic transposition patterns, which builds on the idea of 
different country clusters with different characteristic styles of treating EU adaptation requirements. 
2. Prior approaches and their limited explanatory capacity 
In the late 1990s, analysing the effects of Europeanisation on domestic systems of governance became 
a new core issue in political science. Focusing mainly on environmental policy, many scholars have 
pointed to the degree of fit or misfit between European rules and existing institutional and regulatory 
traditions as one of the central factors determining implementation performance. Seen from this angle, 
European policies face deeply rooted institutional and regulatory structures. If both fit together, that is 
if adaptational pressure is low, implementation should be a smooth and unproblematic process easily 
accomplished within the given time limits. If European policies do not match existing traditions, 
however, implementation should be highly contested, leading to considerable delays, and involving a 
high risk of total failure (see in particular Duina 1997, 1999; Duina & Blithe 1999; Knill & Lenschow 
1998, 2000; Börzel 2000). 
                                                      
*   The final version of this article is forthcoming in the European Journal of Political Research. Earlier versions of this 
paper were presented at the ECPR’s 2nd Pan-European Conference on EU Politics in Bologna, the EUSA’s 9th Biennial 
International Conference in Austin, Texas and the ECPR Joint Sessions of Workshops in Granada. We thank all 
participants of these conferences as well as the anonymous reviewers for helpful comments. Special acknowledgements 
go to Simone Leiber, our fourth partner on the project and co-author of our joint book, whose research greatly contributed 
to the findings that are presented here in a fresh form and whose helpful comments on this text are gratefully 
acknowledged. Gerda Falkner, Miriam Hartlapp and Oliver Treib 
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Building on this misfit-centred approach of the first wave of Europeanisation studies, but 
considerably expanding the perspective, Thomas Risse, Maria Green Cowles and James Caporaso 
(2001) have suggested a number of ‘mediating factors’ which may lead to adaptation even in the face 
of high levels of incompatibility. Among these factors, a decision-making structure with a small 
number of veto players figures prominently or, alternatively, a consensus-oriented decision-making 
culture that may be able to avoid stalemate even in systems with multiple veto actors. Similarly, 
Adrienne Héritier and her collaborators developed a catalogue of factors impacting on domestic 
adaptation to EU policies, including the national ‘reform capacity’ which is shaped by supportive actor 
coalitions and veto positions (Héritier et al. 2001). The veto player argument, which was originally 
developed in the general context of comparative politics, starts from the assumption that the reform 
capacity of a political system decreases as the number of distinct actors whose agreement is required 
to pass such a reform increases. Hence, countries with higher numbers of veto players should be 
plagued much more frequently by reform impasses than systems with low numbers of veto players 
(Tsebelis 1995, 2002). Since the transposition of EU Directives also requires the enactment of 
legislative reforms at the domestic level, this argument can also be applied to the more specific area of 
EU implementation research. In fact, this was done by Markus Haverland, who criticised the misfit 
approach by arguing that, in his case studies on the transposition of the Packaging Waste Directive in 
three countries, ‘veto points tend to shape the timing and quality of implementation regardless of 
differential gaps in the goodness of fit between European requirements and national traditions’ 
(Haverland 2000: 100; for a similar analysis that highlights a broader range of macro-institutional 
factors, see Giuliani 2003). 
While recent research has pointed to a range of other factors that may have an impact on 
transposition outcomes (for an overview, see Mastenbroek 2005), the misfit and veto player arguments 
still feature prominently in the literature. Therefore, the following discussion will concentrate on these 
two factors. 
2.1 The misfit hypothesis: mixed outcomes, contradictory causal mechanisms 
As a starting point for testing the misfit hypothesis, we assessed the degree of required adaptations for 
our 91 cases of EU-induced policy adjustment.
1 Policy misfit can be of either a quantitative or 
qualitative nature. In other words, it can relate to a gradual difference (e.g. two months of parental 
leave instead of three as a minimum) or to a matter of principle (e.g. there is no individual right to 
parental leave but the entitlement is restricted to mothers only). Having assessed the legal misfit, we 
calculated a kind of discount in case the practical significance of a legal innovation was comparatively 
lower. For example, a new right may not have been enshrined in domestic law, but it may have related 
to a large part of the workforce through collective agreements. Furthermore, we include in the concept 
of legal misfit an evaluation of the scope of application. In other words, we looked at the coverage of 
any newly attributed right. The importance of such a right may, in some cases, seem very important, 
but may then be seriously limited by a narrow scope of application (e.g. when all atypical workers or 
important sectors of the economy are excluded). 
We assigned a high degree of legal misfit if there are completely new legal rules, far-reaching 
gradual changes and/or important qualitative innovations. Each of them will lead to a high degree of 
policy misfit in our system under the condition that all or a significant number of workers are affected 
and that there is no essential limitation on the level of practical significance. Otherwise, only a 
medium (or even low) degree of policy misfit will result in our classification. A similar logic is 
applied to medium and low degrees of legal misfit. 
                                                      
1   In one of our cases, we have two separate transposition processes due to an exemption granted for a specific time span. 
Therefore, transposing the 6 selected Directives in 15 member states results in 91 cases. Worlds of compliance 
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Table 1: Degrees of misfit and transposition performance 
 Degree  of  Misfit 
Timing   low  medium  high 
less than two years delayed  25  13  3 
delays of two years or more  19 20  7 
Notes Benchmark: essentially correct transposition. Dark shaded cells represent cases which are inconsistent with the 
misfit hypothesis. White cells refer to cases for which no clear expectations may be derived from the hypothesis. Light 
shaded cells denote cases which are in principle consistent with the misfit hypothesis. 4 cases have been omitted since 
essential correctness existed from the outset. 
The first important observation emanating from Table 1 is that a significant share of our cases (38 
per cent altogether) is located in the area of medium adaptational pressure, for which no clear 
expectations may be derived from the hypothesis. This means that the misfit hypothesis is not relevant 
for a significant part of empirical reality. Among the remaining cases, about 60 per cent (37 per cent of 
all cases) are in line with the expectations of the hypothesis (light shaded cells). In order to avoid 
hypercritical benchmarks, this analysis is based on the premise that ‘major delays’ are those where 
essentially correct transposition is reached only two years or more after the given deadline. Everything 
below this cross-over point is treated as being on time or having delays that are of comparatively 
minor relevance. Still, 40 per cent of those cases that fit into the dichotomous logic of the hypothesis 
(25 per cent of all cases) are at odds with the misfit hypothesis (dark shaded cells), either because 
small adaptation requirements were followed by major delays or because large-scale misfit was 
accompanied by relatively smooth transposition. These findings tie in with the theoretical arguments 
against an exclusive focus on the ‘goodness of fit’ suggested by Mastenbroek and Kaeding (2004).  
If that were all, we could continue to stick to the basic concept and keep on adding further auxiliary 
variables in order to explain those cases that do not match the expectations of the parsimonious basic 
argument, as many of the original proponents have done. For example, Börzel’s (2000) ‘pull-and-
push-model’ introduces the mobilisation of supportive societal groups, sometimes also facilitated by 
interventions of the Commission and the European Court of Justice, to explain how reluctant 
governments and administrations may be forced to comply with EU Directives despite high degrees of 
misfit. Knill and Lenschow (2001) add to their misfit-centred model the element of a high 
administrative reform capacity to explain cases where adaptation succeeded despite contradictions 
with core principles of existing regulatory and administrative traditions. But what if the basic rationale 
that underpins the argument, notably that domestic politicians and bureaucrats in general tend to act 
‘as guardians of the status quo, as the shield protecting national legal-administrative traditions’ (Duina 
1997: 157), does not hold? Our detailed qualitative case studies reveal that this basic assumption is 
only weakly supported by empirical reality. 
First, a high degree of misfit may be a welcome opportunity for domestic governments to change 
the status quo in a politically more desirable direction. Governments are not necessarily motivated by 
the will to protect their domestic policies and practices from being fundamentally overhauled. If that 
were true, there would be no major legislative reforms at the domestic level in general. All we would 
be able to observe is gradual, incremental adjustments to otherwise highly stable policy legacies. 
Examples such as the dramatic reversal of some economic and social policies in Britain after Margaret 
Thatcher assumed power in 1979 should suffice to demonstrate that this assumption is overdrawn. Our 
cases clearly demonstrate that party political factors may overrule the misfit logic. For example, the 
Working Time Directive implied huge reforms in Ireland. However, the Irish centre-left government 
not only voted in favour of the Working Time Directive in the Council of Ministers but also readily 
implemented (and even considerably over-implemented) it afterwards because it supported the thrust 
of the reforms politically. Conversely, even relatively minor changes to domestic policies may spur 
ideologically motivated resistance by government parties and thus may give rise to significant delays 
in transposition despite altogether lower degrees of misfit. To exemplify, the German centre-right Gerda Falkner, Miriam Hartlapp and Oliver Treib 
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government refused to comply with the minor reform requirements arising from the Parental Leave 
Directive since the need to include men from single-income couples was at odds with its conservative 
family-policy preferences. It was only after a change of government that the incoming centre-left 
government brought German law fully in line with the Directive and even followed many of its non-
compulsory recommendations. 
Second, our empirical cases also include examples where domestic actors initially resisted the 
fundamental changes implied by EU provisions, but swiftly dropped their resistance in order to avoid 
being in long-term non-compliance with European law. A case in point is Denmark’s rather rapid 
surrender to the fundamental challenges that EU Directives in the field of labour law posed to its 
system of autonomous social partner regulation (for more details, see Leiber 2005). In the working 
time case, the Danish government tried to make use of a Treaty clause that explicitly allowed member 
states to transpose Directives by way of collective agreements since working time was an area 
traditionally left exclusively to the social partners. When it turned out that the Commission did not 
accept this method of transposition because collective agreements even in Denmark are not able to 
guarantee full coverage for all employees, the Danish government and the social partners initially 
refused to sacrifice their established model of social partner autonomy. This gave rise to serious delays 
in transposition. Despite the fundamental clash with historically deeply-rooted traditions, however, 
Danish officials gave in to the Commission’s pressure even before the case was handed over to the 
ECJ, and the Danish government passed legislation that covered all employees to comply with EU 
law. Soon afterwards, the same issue came up again when the Part-time Work Directive had to be 
transposed. Although this Directive also touched on an area that had traditionally been left to 
autonomous social partner regulation, the Danish government and the social partners did not insist on 
defending the ‘Danish model’ since the working time case had revealed that this was not in line with 
EU law. Therefore, the Directive was rather smoothly transposed by way of legislation. This reveals 
that in Denmark, the duty to comply is taken very seriously even in cases of considerable misfit. 
Finally, our case studies demonstrated that under certain conditions, the existence of considerable 
adaptational pressure may even have a positive effect on transposition performance. Luxembourg’s 
rather swift compliance with the fulfilment of the Parental Leave Directive is illustrative in this 
context. Whereas Luxembourg was the prime example among our countries for considerable delays in 
transposing European Directives due to a serious shortage of administrative resources, the government 
in this case, which involved considerable changes to the domestic status quo, managed to pass the 
transposition legislation in an unusually fast and smooth way. Ministry officials stressed that under 
conditions of permanent administrative overload, Directives that require more important changes may 
be treated with higher priority than measures that demand only minor changes. 
It was primarily in some of the cases where regulatory philosophies or deeply entrenched national 
models were at stake that the rationale underlying the misfit argument actually showed up. In these 
cases of qualitative misfit, domestic governments sometimes actually behaved as expected in that they 
tried to protect their traditional ways of doing things. In overall terms, however, our findings 
demonstrate that the causal mechanism underlying the misfit approach may be found only rarely in 
empirical reality. 
2.2 The limited explanatory power of the veto player argument 
Our empirical analysis demonstrates that the veto player argument does not match our results very 
well either. The first important observation is that each and every country in principle seems to be able 
to stick to the deadlines. Even Italy’s political system, which is marked by multiparty coalitions and 
therefore a very high number of veto players, managed to transpose one of our six Directives almost 
on time. Another country with many veto players, Belgium, succeeded in completely meeting the 
deadline in one case and had a delay of only seven months in another case. At the same time, even a 
country with a very low number of veto players like the UK occasionally surpassed the deadlines Worlds of compliance 
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significantly. Besides three cases that were almost on time, we also found three other cases where it took 
two, two and a half and six years until the UK had reached the status of an essentially correct transposition. 
These examples should suffice to demonstrate that the veto player argument does not make sense if 
applied to individual cases of transposition.
2 There are so many idiosyncratic influences that may give 
rise to delays in an individual case that systematic causal effects may only show up if we move away 
from this level of analysis. Such a conceptualisation is also more in line with the thrust of the veto 
player argument, which suggests that countries with high numbers of veto players will generally (but 
not in each and very case) have more difficulty in getting reforms enacted swiftly. Therefore, it seems 
more appropriate to look at whether there is an influence of veto players on the average delays of our 
fifteen countries across the six selected Directives in our sample (see Figure 1).
3 







































































































Source: Falkner, Treib, Hartlapp & Leiber (2005: 297) 
The figure suggests that there is only a weak relationship between the number of veto players and 
member state transposition performance. To be sure, some countries apparently do seem to correspond 
to the expectations of the veto player theory, like the UK, Belgium and Italy. But many of the other 
countries do not fit in nicely. Hence, Greece has as few veto players as the UK, but nevertheless 
performs much worse. Luxembourg, Portugal or France are also examples of countries whose 
                                                      
2   At the level of individual cases, there is no significant relationship between the number of veto players and transposition 
performance, measured as the time needed to reach essentially correct transposition (r = 0.04). 
3   It should be noted that we use the ‘simple’ version of the veto player argument theory here, since this is also the version 
that was introduced to EU implementation research by Markus Haverland. Unlike the general theory suggested by 
Tsebelis (2002), therefore, our analysis focuses only on the number of veto players and does not account for the 
ideological distances between these veto players. 
4   This figure is based on an adjusted version of the veto player data set provided by George Tsebelis. First, missing data 
were added using information reported in Ismayr (2002). Second, we did not count the German Bundesrat as a veto 
player even for periods where the government parties did not hold a majority in the second chamber of the German 
legislature since the transposition of the largest part of our six sample Directives did not require the approval of the 
Bundesrat. Third, following the argument of Steffen Ganghof (2003), we adjusted the data in order to account for the 
specific situation of minority governments. Since a minority government needs the support of the parliamentary 
opposition to get legislation enacted, we calculated one more veto player for periods of minority government. Gerda Falkner, Miriam Hartlapp and Oliver Treib 
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performance is far poorer than one would have expected on the basis of their moderate numbers of 
veto players. Denmark, on the other hand, is clearly better than its institutional reform capacity would suggest. 
Taking a closer look at the causal mechanisms behind these aggregate findings reveals two 
shortcomings of the veto player argument in transposition research. First, we found a significant 
number of cases where the preferences of the veto players had to be taken into account in order to 
explain the outcomes. In some countries, however, these were not only party political preferences, as 
used by Tsebelis (2002) in order to measure ideological distances between veto players, but also the 
preference to comply with EU law, which was shared by politicians from all kinds of parties. 
Denmark’s transposition of the Young Workers Directive is a good case in point. Among other things, 
the Directive required Denmark to raise its minimum age limit, which decided at what age children 
would be allowed to perform light work, from 10 to 13 years. The left-wing minority government 
supported this reform, but the liberal and conservative opposition parties were fiercely opposed to 
such a move. Since the government did not hold a majority in parliament, it needed the consent of at 
least one opposition party. As the policy preferences between the government and the opposition were 
far from harmonious, this was the prototype situation for expecting transposition deadlock, to be 
resolved only after long negotiations and/or by a compromise solution that may make unlawful 
concessions to the opponents. But no such thing happened in Denmark. As the transposition deadline 
was fast approaching, the government offered some concessions in areas that were not related to the 
controversial lifting of the minimum age limit, and the opposition readily gave up its resistance in 
order to avoid a delay in transposition. In other words, policy and ideological differences were 
superseded by a shared commitment to complying with the law. 
The second qualitative finding is even more important: There are a considerable number of 
countries where transposition regularly remains an administrative process isolated from political 
actors, at least for a long time. Under these conditions, which are best illustrated by Greece, the 
number of political veto players is irrelevant for long periods of the process, as political actors do not 
even become involved in the first place. This is the explanation for why Greece performed so poorly 
despite its low number of veto players – Greece was governed by a single-party government 
throughout the 1990s, and this government was even made up of the left-wing PASOK, which should 
be ideologically in favour of social policy standards. To be sure, the low number of veto players 
makes it very easy for the Greek government to enact transposition decrees or laws once the pressure 
from the Commission and the ECJ have become strong enough to put an end to bureaucratic inactivity. 
However, this does not help much if the administration fails to initiate a political reform process in the 
first place. The veto player logic is thus not wrong, but veto players sometimes simply do not play a 
crucial role in transposition. 
Altogether, therefore, the world seems to be more complicated than both the misfit and the veto 
player arguments suggest. By contrast, the next section will discuss a more selective application of both 
theoretical propositions, on the basis of our own approach to explaining transposition performance. 
3. Three worlds of compliance: typical modes of reacting to EU adaptation requirements 
In our project, we originally coded all interviews with Atlas.ti and used these data to test the misfit 
and veto player arguments as well as a wealth of other hypotheses derived from the literature across all 
of our 91 cases. As the above analysis has demonstrated for the misfit and veto player arguments, 
however, no causal arrow pre-supposed by existing theories seemed either necessary or sufficient in 
practice and none of the correlations was strong enough to yield satisfactory explanations (Falkner, 
Treib, Hartlapp & Leiber 2005: chapter 14). Somewhat disappointed, we returned to our original data, 
re-read our interviews and discussed what the researchers responsible for each member state had 
concluded after all their lengthy interviews in the individual countries. Through this second, more 
inductive process of data analysis, we finally discovered that some EU member states displayed quite 
a regular pattern of compliance or non-compliance, regardless of how the specific provisions actually Worlds of compliance 
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fitted with the relevant national policy legacy or of the number of veto points in the political system. 
Starting our evaluation from a country-specific perspective anew, we then also paid attention to the 
broader context and to what the interview partners had told us about compliance with EU law in their 
countries more generally. 
This re-evaluation of our data finally revealed three clusters of countries, each showing a specific 
typical pattern of reacting to EU-induced reform requirements, hence a specific national culture of 
appraising and processing adaptation requirements.
5 ‘Culture’ has been defined as a ‘general set of 
cognitive rules and recipes in terms of which agents, institutions, and structures are constituted’ 
(Berger/Luckmann 1967 quoted in Swidler 2001: 3064) or as a ‘shared interpretive scheme’ (Douglas 
2001: 3149). Since cultural norms typically change slowly and reflect enduring patterns of political 
action, political culture is a critical element in understanding politics across countries (Almond, 
Powell, Strøm & Dalton 2000: 49f.). 
Since we discerned three different patterns of how member states handle the duty of complying 
with EU law (with differing weights of cultural, political and administrative factors in the 
implementation process), a typology seemed the natural solution to going beyond casual empiricism 
(Castles 2001: 141). Starting from the ‘real types’ we found in our six cases per country, we hence 
formed the ‘ideal types’ presented below, including also the broader information regarding national 
specifics collected in our interviews. Our intellectual map now builds on three different worlds of 
compliance within the fifteen EU member states covered by our study: a world of law observance, a 
world of domestic politics, and a world of neglect. 
The three worlds do not indicate outcomes,
6 but typical modes of treating transposition duties. The 
specific results of particular examples of compliance tend to depend on different factors within each of 
the various worlds: the compliance culture in the field can explain most cases in the world of law 
observance, while in the world of domestic politics the specific fit with political preferences in each 
case plays a much larger role, and in the world of neglect this is true for administrative non-action. These 
patterns seem to be rather stable over time and to outlive governments of opposing ideological orientation. 
3.1 The worlds of law observance, domestic politics and neglect 
In the world of law observance, the compliance goal typically overrides domestic concerns (see Table 
2). Even if there are conflicting national policy styles, interests or ideologies, transposition of EU 
Directives is usually both in time and correct. Additionally, citizens are used to complying. This 
pattern is supported by a national ‘compliance culture’. Non-compliance, by contrast, typically occurs 
only rarely and not without fundamental domestic traditions or basic regulatory philosophies being at 
stake. In addition, the tendency is for instances of non-compliance to be ended quickly. Based on a 
detailed empirical analysis of the typical transposition patterns prevalent in our fifteen countries, we 
assigned Denmark, Finland and Sweden to this country cluster. 
                                                      
5   While our study indicates that attitudinal factors should play a central role in the study of EU-triggered implementation 
processes, only a few studies have already taken this into consideration. Outside the area of EU implementation research, 
a similar approach was followed by Jeremy Richardson and his collaborators (1982), who argue that Western European 
countries are characterised by certain ‘policy styles’. On a much more general level Klaus Goetz (2002) identifies ‘Four 
Worlds of Europeanisation’. Starting from Commission data on infringement proceedings Ulf Sverdrup (2004) identifies 
a ‘Nordic Model’ of good compliance. He argues that a culture of compliance and of compromise, together with 
transparency and organisation of the administration, is a crucial factor for a country’s implementation performance. 
6   The implementation performance in a particular sample of cases may be as mediocre (or bad) in a country belonging to 
the world of domestic politics as in a country in the world of neglect, or it may turn out to be as good (or mediocre) as in 
a country from the world of law observance. What is important is that these outcomes are reached through very different 
processes. Gerda Falkner, Miriam Hartlapp and Oliver Treib 
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By contrast, obeying EU rules is at best one goal among many, in the world of domestic politics. 
Domestic concerns frequently prevail if there is a conflict of interests, and each single act of 
transposing an EU Directive tends to happen on the basis of a fresh cost–benefit analysis. 
Transposition is likely to be timely and correct where no domestic concerns dominate over the fragile 
aspiration to comply. In cases of a manifest clash between EU requirements and domestic interest 
politics, non-compliance is the likely outcome. While in the countries belonging to the world of law 
observance, breaking EU law would not be a socially acceptable state of affairs, it is much less of a 
problem in one of the countries in this second category. At times, their politicians or major interest 
groups even openly call for disobedience with European duties – an appeal that is not met with much 
serious condemnation in these countries. With regard to transposition, we subsumed Austria, Belgium, 
Germany, Italy, Ireland, the Netherlands, Spain and the UK under this type (but Italy and Ireland 
belong to the third group presented below, in overall terms
7). 
Table 2: Three worlds of compliance 
 World  of   
LAW OBSERVANCE 
World of  
DOMESTIC 
POLITICS 
World of  
NEGLECT 
Typical process  Dutiful adaptation.  Conflict / compromise.  Inertia. 
Transposition is 
typically... 
… on time and correct (even 
where conflicting domestic 
interests exist). 
… on time and correct only if 
there is no conflict with 
domestic concerns. 
… late and/or ‘pro forma’. 
Conditions of non-
compliance 
Lack of awareness; otherwise 
non-compliance occurs rarely 
and briefly. 
Political failure (lack of 
compromise among 
conflicting interests or 
compromise against the terms 
of EU law). If non-compliance 




Non-compliance is the rule 
rather than the exception. 
Factors facilitating 
compliance 
Culture of good compliance as 
a self-reinforcing social 
mechanism. 
Fit with preferences of 
government and major interest 
groups. 
Accelerating issue linkage 
with domestic reforms, high 
profile of particular cases. 
Source: adapted from Falkner, Treib, Hartlapp & Leiber (2005: 322) 
In the countries forming the world of neglect, compliance with EU law is no goal in itself. Those 
domestic actors that are calling for more obedience thus have even less of a sound cultural basis for 
doing so than in the world of domestic politics. At least as long as there is no powerful action by 
supranational actors (like an infringement procedure triggered by the European Commission), 
transposition obligations are often not recognised at all in these ‘neglecting’ countries. A posture of 
‘national arrogance’ (in the sense that indigenous standards are typically expected to be superior) may 
support this, as may administrative inefficiency. In these cases we found inertia to be the most 
frequent road to transposition failure. Thus, the typical initial reaction to an EU-related 
implementation duty is inactivity. After an intervention by the European Commission, the 
transposition process may finally be initiated and may even proceed rather swiftly. The result, 
                                                      
7  Our typology differentiates between stages of the implementation process. Since neglectful enforcement of a Directive’s 
standards may counterbalance dutiful performance during the transposition stage, we suggest looking at both the stage of 
transposition and the subsequent stage of enforcement and application when assigning countries to the different worlds of 
compliance. In fact, there are two countries (Ireland and Italy) that follow a logic of domestic politics when it comes to 
transposition but neglect their duties to ensure proper enforcement. As the focus in this paper is on transposition only, we 
treat these countries as members of the world of domestic politics, although they belong to the world of neglect if we 
look at the implementation process as a whole. Worlds of compliance 
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however, is not infrequently correct only at the surface. This tends to be the case where ministerial 
decrees are used (instead of laws) and where literal translation of EU Directives takes place. 
According to our empirical findings, France, Greece, Luxembourg and Portugal belong to this country 
cluster when it comes to transposition.
8 
Approaching an explanation of these patterns, it seems useful to distinguish between the 
administrative and the political phases of the transposition process. It is the task of the administrative 
systems in the member states to identify reform requirements implied by EU law and to initiate a 
process leading towards adaptation. The second phase then typically involves more than 
administrators only. In a political process, politicians, interest groups and potential further actors in a 
country’s political system interact in order to reach decisions on domestic transposition. We found that 
in each world, a characteristic constellation of more or less dutiful action dominates in each phase. In 
the world of law observance, abiding by EU rules is usually the dominant goal in both the 
administrative and the political systems. The same is only true for the administrative system when it 
comes to the world of domestic politics. There, the process can easily be blocked or diverted during 
the phase of political contestation. In the world of neglect, by contrast, not even the administration acts 
in a dutiful way when it comes to the implementation of EU Directives. Therefore, the political 
process is typically not even started when it should be. It needs to be mentioned, however, that 
politicians in the world of neglect also do not tend to take compliance with EU law very seriously, 
otherwise the bureaucrats could not get away with such behaviour, at least in the longer run. Table 3 
below outlines these patterns for all three worlds. 
Table 3: Law-observance of administrative and political systems in the three worlds of 
compliance 
EU law-observance 
dominant in ... 
World of  
LAW OBSERVANCE 
World of  
DOMESTIC POLITICS 




+ +  - 
... political system  + -  - 
Source: Falkner, Treib, Hartlapp & Leiber (2005: 325) 
3.2 Sometimes-true theories and the worlds of compliance 
The above suggests that crucial hypotheses in the EU implementation literature may only be 
‘sometimes-true theories’ (Coleman 1964: 517). This does not only mean that there are general scope 
conditions delineating the areas of empirical reality for which these theoretical propositions are 
relevant at all, but also that the factors highlighted by these theories may have a systematically 
differential impact in various groups of countries. Our typology of three worlds of compliance 
provides an important filter suggesting that different mechanisms matter in different worlds. Even the 
direction of their influence may vary between different clusters of countries. Let us illustrate this by 
means of the two arguments discussed earlier. 
Our analysis revealed that the logic underlying the misfit hypothesis only showed up in few cases, 
which were mostly associated with challenges to deeply entrenched institutional or policy traditions. 
To paraphrase Coleman’s dictum, this implies that the misfit argument in general seems to be a ‘very 
rarely-true theory’. The typology helps explain why that is the case, and it reveals that the ‘goodness 
                                                      
8  As already mentioned, Ireland and Italy would have to be added to this list if we extended our focus to include also the 
phases of application and enforcement. Gerda Falkner, Miriam Hartlapp and Oliver Treib 
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of fit’ may have an inverse effect in different country clusters. In the world of neglect, high degrees of 
misfit may even facilitate transposition, as negligent or ineffective administrations tend to treat more 
visible cases with higher priority, which means that the usual pattern of long phases of administrative 
inertia may be avoided in cases of significant misfit. In the world of law observance, in turn, the strong 
commitment to compliance with the law prevalent among administrative and political actors usually 
means that even major deviations from traditional paths are fulfilled dutifully. However, misfit related 
factors seem best suited to explaining deviant cases in our sample (particularly misfit with deeply 
engrained features such as corporatism, or extremely minor misfit that seems unworthy of legislative 
action). To the extent that resistance arises, it is typically of a short-term nature only and may be 
overcome rather swiftly. In the world of domestic politics, finally, the amount of misfit with existing 
traditions may spur opposition from disadvantaged groups. Yet, it is the political assessment of the 
required reforms by governments that determines whether or not the opposing forces will prevail. This 
political assessment may well follow a party political logic, which can lead governments to support 
even major policy shifts if these correspond to their party political goals. In contrast, however, the 
realisation of rather minor adaptations may also be seriously delayed if these modifications run 
counter to some core goals of the parties in office (Treib 2003, 2004). 
Overall, the veto player argument fares better than the misfit hypothesis, but its primary field of 
application is restricted to the world of domestic politics. As our above account of Greece 
demonstrates, in contrast, the number of veto players is of little relevance for transposition 
performance in the world of neglect. This is because the typical pattern in this country cluster is the 
absence of any political process due to long phases of administrative inertia. Veto players involved in 
the political process only come into play in those exceptional cases where administrative inertia is 
avoided, e.g. by high degrees of misfit or by linkages to other domestic reform processes, or after 
inertia has been overcome by external interventions from the Commission. It is only under these 
conditions that countries with a low number of veto players tend to perform relatively better than those 
with more unfavourable political structures in the world of neglect. In the world of law observance, the 
number of veto players will not tell us much about transposition outcomes either. Here, cultural 
dispositions typically ensure that irrespective of the significance of the required reforms, all veto 
players, even those that are negatively affected, take the duty to comply with EU law more seriously 
than the pursuit of their own interests. 
In the world of domestic politics, political contestation about the costs and benefits of required 
adaptations is the typical pattern. The number of veto players in domestic polities therefore plays an 
important role in determining whether opposing interests will be able to prevail. This is one of the 
major reasons why the overall transposition performance of Italy or Belgium, which are marked by 
multi-party coalition governments, was worse than that of the two-party coalition governments in 
Germany or Austria, and why the performance of these countries tended to be worse than the 
performance of the UK’s ‘Westminster system’ of single-party governments that are unconstrained by 
any other veto players. To be sure, there are also other important factors that play a role in this country 
cluster, especially the party political preferences of governments. However, the more actors need to 
agree to a piece of transposition legislation, the higher the likeliness that one of the veto players will 
have reservations against transposition, either for ideological reasons or because of concerns voiced by 
important groups of voters. Among the countries in the world of domestic politics, therefore, those 
with low numbers of veto players by and large performed better than those with many veto players. 
This demonstrates that our typology of three worlds of compliance is instructive in telling us when 
and how the existing ‘sometimes-true theories’ on compliance with EU legislation are actually 
applicable. In the world of domestic politics, we should focus on veto players, party political 
preferences, changes of government and interest group pressure. Determining how governments and 
major interest groups assess the required reforms on the basis of their own political preferences will be 
of great importance for explaining implementation success or failure here.  Worlds of compliance 
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In the world of neglect, administrative factors play a crucial role in explaining the way Directives 
are incorporated into national law. However, these administrative shortcomings come in different 
forms, including administrative inefficiency and coordination problems, administrative overload and 
the general unwillingness of administrative actors to acknowledge reform requirements imposed by 
EU law. Focusing merely on the amount of administrative resources would therefore miss the point, as 
the administrations in some countries seem to have enough resources, but are either organised too 
ineffectively to ensure proper performance or are characterised by a lack of willingness on the part of 
administrative actors to accept EU demands and to initiate processes of adaptation. Irrespective of 
these differences, the major problems in these countries lie in the administrative rather than the 
political sphere. High degrees of misfit tend to facilitate transposition in these countries, as these cases 
are more easily visible and are therefore treated with higher priority by administrative actors. 
In the world of law observance, finally, the presence of a shared culture of good compliance among 
both political and administrative actors is the most important determinant of transposition 
performance. This cultural factor ensures that the administrations in these countries are generally 
organised effectively and that political conflicts over how to incorporate EU Directives into domestic 
legislation usually are solved without significant transposition delays and without compromises that 
run counter to EU law. 
4. Conclusions and outlook 
The typology of three worlds of compliance presented in this paper (see in more detail Falkner, Treib, 
Hartlapp & Leiber 2005) can be seen as a filter that decides which factors are relevant for different 
countries and what the direction of their influence is. In this sense, crucial theoretical propositions in 
EU implementation research, including the misfit and the veto player approaches, are only 
‘sometimes-true theories’. While our own approach is certainly less parsimonious then any of these 
arguments, it draws a much more realistic picture of member state performance in fulfilling the 
prescriptions of EU law. We trust that the typology of three worlds gives a more valid impression of 
compliance processes in the fifteen countries covered by our study than any of the causal factors 
presented in earlier research on compliance with EU law across all EU member states. Expressed in a 
more technical language, we expect the following: 
-  Hypothesis 1: If a country belongs to the world of law observance, transposition will 
typically proceed in a dutiful manner for both administrators and politicians act according 
to a culture of respecting the rule of law. This cultural factor is hence crucial in explaining 
outcomes since it usually overrides other variables both from the political and from the 
administrative sphere.  
-  Hypothesis 2: If a country belongs to the world of domestic politics, the transposition 
process will be typically characterised by political negotiations between parties and interest 
groups, sometimes leading to swift adaptation and sometimes to resistance. Veto players 
and political ideology are therefore the crucial variables to look at. 
-  Hypothesis 3: If a country belongs to the world of neglect, the typical process pattern will 
be long phases of inertia, as the administration does not even initiate the transposition 
process properly. Non-transposition will be the typical outcome, at least until Commission 
intervention may serve as an external trigger. Administrative interests and traditions hence 
explain most problems in this cluster of countries. 
The extensive and intensive empirical analysis of our 91 cases was indispensable for laying the 
foundations of our innovative approach to EU implementation theory. Without field work on many 
individual cases of (non-)compliance, one cannot know whether a case is typical of others and which 
cases may be subsumed under the heading of a relatively homogenous group. At least, this is true if we 
are looking for the processes and causal mechanisms that are at work in the different member states Gerda Falkner, Miriam Hartlapp and Oliver Treib 
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producing compliance or non-compliance with EU law. While countries could also be classified on the 
basis of statistical methods, there would still be uncertainty as to whether the resulting groups of cases 
are actually kept together by the same causal mechanisms rather than by similar (but potentially 
spurious) statistical correlations. 
We developed the typology on the basis of fresh data on the transposition of EU labour law 
Directives in 15 member states. It is possible, however, that the scope of our findings may be broader. 
One argument could be that the leeway for any administration to disregard EU duties will not 
fundamentally differ between issue areas. It also seems that the specific compliance cultures can 
reasonably be expected to cover not only labour law and even the social policy arena, but also all or 
many EU-related policies (see also Sverdrup 2004). However, systematic empirical research is 
certainly needed to establish whether and to what extent the typology may actually shed light on other 
policy areas. 
Ideally, testing should be done on the basis of a large number of new qualitative case studies. Such 
research could directly scrutinize whether the process features we claim to be typical for countries in 
the three worlds may actually be found beyond our particular cases. If qualitative studies revealed 
different procedural patterns than those suggested by our typology, our theory would be falsified. 
Testing with quantitative data, such as Commission statistics on infringement proceedings, is only a 
second-best option, as transposition outcomes are only an indirect indicator for the underlying 
processes prevalent in the different worlds (see below for a second drawback of the Commission’s 
infringement data). While our typology clearly expects the world of law observance to perform much 
better than the world of neglect, things are less clear if it comes to the world of domestic politics, 
where different political circumstances may give rise to either good compliance or transposition 
problems. It is only if we look at a large number of cases that cover many different (favourable and 
unfavourable) constellations of government etc., that we can expect the transposition performance of 
the world of domestic politics to fall in between the two other worlds. 
While stressing again that our typology relates to typical process patterns, and not to outcomes, it is 
still of interest to mention here that the three clusters on average perform as expected when we look at 
the transposition performance of the six Directives we studied empirically. The average total delays 
until countries had reached the status of essentially correct transposition (Falkner, Treib, Hartlapp & 
Leiber 2005: Table 13.6) are shortest in the world of law observance (27 months after the deadline) 
and longest in the world of neglect (47 months), with the world of domestic politics in the middle 
range (31 months). 
Much less reliable than the data we gained from in-depth case studies are certainly the statistics on 
notification rates provided by the member states themselves for the Commission. Still, we found that 
our ideal typical clusters indeed show systematically differing performances: while the countries in the 
world of law observance on average claimed to have transposed 97,41% of all Directives, the rate was 
only 96,01% in the world of domestic politics and 94,89% in the world of neglect. 
Although our study revealed that the Commission’s data on legal steps initiated against member 
states that did not comply with EU law are quite problematic
9, we also confronted our typology with 
these statistics. Once again, we find confirmatory patterns. The countries in the world of law 
observance received on average only 12 reasoned opinions per year between 1998 and 2002; those 
belonging to the world of domestic politics received 38, and those in the world of neglect even 
                                                      
9  There is a fundamental difference in analysing data on official Commission infringement procedures and in looking at 
actual non-compliance in the member states, for Commission action often does not take place at all (20 per cent of all 
cases in which Commission intervention would have been required) or only takes place in an inconsistent manner 
compared to the Commission’s internal rules (59 per cent of all cases in which action would have been required). The 
Commission statistics represent only the tip of the iceberg, which does not necessarily say much about the size or the 
shape of those parts that remain below the waterline (see Hartlapp 2005: 188-197; Falkner, Treib, Hartlapp & Leiber 
2005: 219). Worlds of compliance 
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received 48.
10 These data suggest that at the aggregate level of transposition outcomes, the three 
clusters of member states actually perform as expected by our typology. Despite the poor quality of 
these cross-sectoral data, this finding may serve as an indication that the typology is empirically 
relevant beyond the specific cases we studied. 
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Source: Annual Reports on Monitoring the Application of Community Law 1998-2002 
In sum, the typology of three worlds of compliance presented in this article may serve as a 
powerful key to understanding when and where individual theoretical propositions from earlier studies 
in the field are more or less viable, and as a useful theoretical starting point for further research in the field. 
                                                      
10  Calculated from the Annual Reports on Monitoring the Application of Community Law 1998-2002. Gerda Falkner, Miriam Hartlapp and Oliver Treib 
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